Powering Apollo by W. Henry Lambright

In Powering Apollo, political science and public administration professor W. Henry Lambright takes a management-oriented look at the life and work of James E. Webb. Webb, who served as the second NASA administrator (1961—1968), presided over most of the Apollo program, retiring months before the July 1969 landing of Apollo 11. Lambright examines how Webb formed his management philosophy in several positions in both government and the public sector, then demonstrates how he applied this philosophy to the leadership of one of the most complex projects of all time: achieving the goal, before the decade was out, of landing a man on the moon and returning him safely to the Earth. 

Lambright’s book is a refreshing change of pace in the Apollo literature. Many books focus on the detailed technical aspects of the program. Many others focus on the work and personalities of the astronauts on the front lines. But relatively few look at the top-level management of Apollo, the part of the program that held everything else together. Webb was tasked with marshaling billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of scientists, engineers, technicians, and support staff toward a singular purpose. That purpose was unprecedented in human history. Just a few years earlier, it would have been seen as outright science fiction. What’s more, all of the interim steps in pursuit of that purpose would be carried out under the scrutiny of the public and the Congress who were bankrolling the operation. And competitive pressure from behind the Iron Curtain would loom constantly over the entire program. Webb’s work would not be easy. But as Lambright shows, he was exactly the right man for the job.

A mix of diligent preparation and lucky timing made Webb a natural fit to become the NASA administrator. In the 1940s, Webb spent time leading the Bureau of the Budget in the Truman administration, gaining experience working with both the president and with Congress. In the 1950s, he worked in the State Department before moving over to the private sector at an Oklahoma oil company. While in Oklahoma he spearheaded an initiative to improve science education in the state. These efforts ramped up in early 1957. When, in October of that year, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the national attention of the United States turned to what would now be called STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math). Webb was ahead of the curve here, and the Oklahoma model was cited by President Dwight D. Eisenhower as an example for the nation to follow.

A few years later, despite a lack of specific experience in rocketry and space, Webb was brought aboard by the Kennedy administration as NASA’s second administrator. He had been recommended for the position by the president’s science adviser and a trusted senator, both of them contacts he had cultivated in his previous careers. Webb sought to bring innovative management strategies to the young agency.

Lambright notes that a key part of Webb’s management style was evident in his relationship with the presidents he served, John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Webb saw only the president as his boss, refusing to be pushed around by other White House staff or government officials. Lambright identifies several other elements of Webb’s management arrangement: the use of a small committee consisting of him and two other officials (a “triad”) to make critical decisions, the implementation of well-defined chains of command, and systems of checks and balances within NASA.

The result was a massive government agency that could remain rigid in its ultimate goal while maintaining flexibility in reaching that goal. Perhaps the most visible example of this was the short-notice retasking of Apollo 8. Originally intended to fly a Command/Service Module (CSM) and Lunar Module, the mission threatened to be delayed when Lunar Module development fell behind schedule. At the same time, the agency faced the specter of a potential Soviet lunar flight ahead of its own. NASA planners decided to change the mission profile to a daring CSM-only flight around the moon. Webb approved the change, and the dramatic success of Apollo 8 vaulted the program forward.

Government bureaucracies are frequently maligned as wasteful and inefficient, but Webb believed strongly in their power to get big things done, given the proper leadership and management. One of his most important leadership roles was defending NASA from multiple angles as the program proceeded. This was the most interesting section of the book to me, as I was relatively unfamiliar with the organized contemporary opposition to Apollo. As it turns out, in the mid 1960s the program had harsh critics both inside and outside the government.

In the early years of the program, Webb worked hard to defend NASA’s budgets with Congress, recognizing that the goal was only achievable if the nation gave NASA strong financial backing. Webb also defended the agency against attempts by the Department of Defense to carve out parts of the space program for itself. At one point, DOD sought to control all missions in Earth orbit, with NASA taking only missions beyond that. Webb ensured that the civilian space program would come first.

Following the Apollo 1 fire, which killed three astronauts in January 1967, Webb forcefully defended Apollo and the agency in Congress. Some in the legislature sought to make cutbacks in the program, pointing to safety concerns and the need for the money elsewhere. With congresspeople seeking to score political points by taking NASA to task for perceived incompetency, Webb spoke up in defense of the agency at hearings.

In the midst of the fire’s aftermath, newspaper editorials also criticized Apollo, slamming the apparently lax safety measures and an end-of-decade goal that they accused of being a simple political slogan from the heady, fast-receding days of the early 1960s. Throughout this, Webb skillfully threaded the needle of defending his agency while remaining loyal to the president’s position on space policy. Lambright shows that Webb’s political acumen and his stout defense of NASA helped hold the program together in difficult times.

Lambright does a wonderful job of bringing a wide variety of sources to bear, relying on interviews, memos, reports, and other documents. He carried out extensive research at archives and presidential libraries, and it shows. Everything points toward the thesis encapsulated by the title: Webb’s management truly did power Apollo. That said, the book can be a little dry at times, especially for those who aren’t going into it with a special interest in management techniques. However, once the book gets into Webb’s tenure at NASA, I found my interest level picking up again and remaining high through the conclusion.

The book is technically very solid, particularly considering the author doesn’t appear to necessarily be an expert in space. There are a few minor technical/nomenclature errors—for instance, at one point he calls the Saturn V’s S-II stage the “Saturn 2”—but there’s nothing that significantly detracts or distracts from the overall work.

Before reading Powering Apollo, I knew relatively little about Webb. I essentially knew him as the administrator who left shortly before the moon landing—it always seemed bizarre he would leave just before program’s climax. (To ensure the program’s quick pace would continue, and to avoid politicizing NASA, he departed and allowed deputy administrator Thomas O. Paine to take on the role before the presidential election). Lambright’s book does a wonderful job of illuminating Webb’s career and demonstrating just how instrumental he was to Apollo’s success. Webb saw Apollo as the ultimate management challenge, and though he left in 1968, he put into place a management system whose momentum carried Apollo through its conclusion in the 1970s.